Term
Aranson v Quick Point Pencil Co.
440 U.S. 257 (1979) |
|
Definition
U.S. = United States Court Reporter
U.S. District Court > U.S. Court of Appeals > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: Case about a woman named Aranson who tried to get a patent on a keyholder she invented. It wasn't approved but QPP was paying her a % of the price that they were selling it for. QPP sued Aranson when the patent was not approved even thought they had put a percentage in the contract that they planned on paying her regardless of the patent. The District Court said the language in the contract was plain and could not be overturned. Went to the U.S. Court of Appeals where the decision was reversed. Aranson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court where she won and the decision was reversed again. The issue in this case was whether a State Contract Law pre-empted a Federal Patent Law. The verdict was that the state contract law pre-empts the federal patent law as long as it doesn't interfere with the 3 specific intentions outlined in the federal patent law.
Influence: Decided that a state contract law could override a federal patent law |
|
|
Term
Diamond v Chakrabarty
447 U.S. 33 (1980) |
|
Definition
U.S. = U.S. Court Reporter
Patent Office Board of Appeals > U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: Chakrabarty was a microbiologist who engineered a bacterium with the ability to break down compontents of crude oil. He wanted patents on 3 elements of the process. He got two of them but was rejected for a patent on the bacterium itself because patentable inventions does not include living organisms. Chakrabarty(plaintiff) took it to the Patent Board of Appeals where he lost. He appealed it to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals where the decision was reversed stating "the fact that microorganisms are alive is without legal significance". Diamond, the commissioner of Patent and Trademarks filed a writ of certiorari the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue in this case is whether a person can put a patent on a living organism. Ruled in favor of Chakrabarty because he invented a new type of bacteria that could not be found in nature(it was manufactured). One defense by the judges was the Pland Patent Act. One used by the dissent was Article 1, Section 8 which stated that patents couldn't be used on living organisms.Diamond v. Chakrabarty has set a precedent over the last 30 years that living organisms, if genetically engineered by humans, are patentable subject matter. |
|
|
Term
Minnesota v Carter
525 U.S. 83 (1998) |
|
Definition
U.S. Court Reporter
Minnesota Trial Court > State Appeals Court > Minnesota Supreme Court > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: An officer witnessed cocaine packaging in a house because of a tip that the police station received. Found Carter, Johns and the lessee of the house Thompson, bagging cocaine. He arrested them and the respondents made a motion to suppress the evidence because the officer was doing an unreasonable search in violation of the 4th Amendment. The trial court said that the respondents were not overnight social guests and therefore did not have protection by the 4th Amendment. The State Appeals Court confirmed that decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the first two decisions after Carter appealed again. The state of Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court and it was granted. The issue for the court was to decide if Carter was protected under the 4th Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Minnesota. This case sets up controversy over who are really protected under the Fourth Amendment. Especially, the criteria between if guests are protected under the Fourth Amend as same as the homeowners, is not strictly defined |
|
|
Term
Arizona v Gant
216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640 (2009) |
|
Definition
Arizona State Trial Court > Arizona Court of Appeals > Arizona Supreme Court > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: An officer went to Gant's home after receiving a tip about the buying and selling of drugs. Gant wasn't home but they ran a screen on his past activities and found that there was a warrant out for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. The officer returned and arrested Gant. He searched Gant's car and found cocaine and a handgun. Gant motioned to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion because the search was a direct result of his arrest. The Arizona Court of Appeals said that the search was unconstitutional and when Arizona appealed that decision the State Supreme Court agreed with Gant. Arizona appealed the decision once again to the U.S. Supreme Court. : The question that the U.S. Supreme Court needed to determine was did the search and seizure of Gant’s automobile violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment? The Fourth Amendment explicitly states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” So, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gant. : Arizona v. Gant is extremely important because it changed the way that courts look at vehicular search and seizures |
|
|
Term
Bowsher v Synar
478 U.S. 714 |
|
Definition
U.S. District Court > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: U.S. Gov had a big deficit and in 1985 Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Stated that if the deficit got past a certain amount, budgets must be cut. The budgets were submitted to the Comptroller General. He reported his conclusion to the President who issued a "sequestration" which mandated the spending reductions. Since Congress could remove the Comproller it was apart of the legislative branch. National Treasury Employees Union and 12 congressmen including Synar challenged it as unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court ruled it was unconstitutional and it was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue was if it was a violation of the separation of powers. Did Congress empower the Comptroller who was apart of the legislative branch with executive power? The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the District Court's decision. They made it because it was unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 8 which says the legislative branch creates the laws and the executive branch executes the laws. This decision reinforced the separation of powers between the branches. |
|
|
Term
| Lai Chau v Southstar Equity Limited Co. and Brookside Properties, Inc. |
|
Definition
Florida Circuit Court > Florida Court of Appeals
Summary: Lai Chau was a student at the University of South Florida who was abducted from her apartment's parking lot, shot 3 times and left for dead. Chau sued the owner of the complex for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. She sued on the basis of inadequate security and not warning the tenants of the high crime occurrence. She won money for compensation damages and punitive damages in the the original case in the Florida Circuit Court. Southstar appealed it to the Court of Appeals of Florida where the decision was upheld. Southstar tried to appeal again to the Supreme Court of Florida but it was dismissed due to no basis for them to use discretionary jurisdiction.This case is important because it is considered a landmark case pertaining to negligent security and the rights of tenants. |
|
|
Term
In Re Yamaha Motor Corp Rhino ATV Product Liability Litigation
No. 09-MD-02016 |
|
Definition
Currently in the U.S. District Court
Summary: The Yamaha Rhino All Terrain Vehicle has been responsible for 59 deaths and is prone to rolling over. This case is still not settled but is currently a multidistrict litigation which is a consolidation of civil actions that all have similar issues. It's currently in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Yamaha has only lost 1 of the last 5 cases due to their defense that customers were using it in "ways they're not supposed to be used". On top of that, Yamaha had a recent voluntary recall to add safety standards to the ATV. So, if it is not returned by the customer and injuries occur, Yamaha is not liable. The current issues involved in this case are Is Yamaha responsible for the deaths caused by the Rhino ATV?
Is Yamaha’s Rhino ATV safe enough to be on the market?
Should Yamaha have to follow strict safety laws when making Rhino ATVs? While these cases have not yet been settled, they have brought to light issues of safety in all court cases. |
|
|
Term
Morales v Lia
238 AD 2d 786 (1997) |
|
Definition
Trial Court > Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
Summary: Morales was struck by a car in a strip mall parking lot. He sued the drivers for negligence as well as the mall owner William Lia for failure to provide safe conditions to pedestrians. Morales filed a not of issue so the case would be ready to be tried the day the note was filed. Lia moved for a summary judgment which is a decision without a trial. Morales tried to forgo his original motion and add local and State laws to his bill but it was denied by the Supreme Court. Lia was granted the summary judgment and was not responsible for the accident because more safety signs wouldn't have prevented the accident. It was appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York. The issues were if the accident was caused by the driver’s failure to operate a vehicle? Did the shopping mall’s lack of safe conditions cause Gainer to hit Morales?
Can plaintiffs amend bill of particulars and vacate a note of issue?
Morales lost because he couldn't provide evidence to show that Lia failed to uphold safety laws. Also, Morales failed to establish merit to his application, so his motion to vacate the note of issue was denied because there was no good cause or substantial reasoning. This case has been the basis of ruling for several other cases. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
U.S. District Court of the Norther District of California > U.S. Court of Appeals
Summary: Perfect 10 is an adult magazine publisher who also runs an online adult website. A majority of the pictures of its models are copyrighted and the name “Perfect 10” is trademarked so that it cannot be used by other magazines or websites. Over the last decade, Perfect 10 has fought three very similar cases involving secondary liability issues, Perfect 10 v Visa being the third of them. Visa and a number of other affiliated banks were the financial middle men that processed the transactions for credit cards from websites who had stolen copyrighted and trademarked information. Perfect 10 informed Visa through notices that some of the customers used their credit cards for buying infringing photos. However, Visa did not reciprocate with any actions or punishment to these companies. Perfect 10 filed a suit against these banks on January 28th, 2004. Their claims were copyright and trademarked infringement as well as violation of a number of California laws including false advertisement, libel and interference of prospective economic advantages. The rights of Perfect 10 that were being infringed upon were derivative works, distribution of copies, public display, and reproduction. The Defendants in this case made a motion to dismiss in the original U.S. District Court of the Norther District of California. The Court dismissed the charges of libel and intentional interference charges but allowed Perfect 10 to continue with the other charges. When Perfect 10 simply repeated its original allegations against Visa, the Court allowed Visa to motion for a second dismiss. This time they granted it on all charges. Perfect 10 appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The issues were if Visa had knowledge of an underlying direct copyright infringement and did they intentionally contribute to it?
Was Visa in any real partnership with the companies who infringed Perfect 10's property? Did Visa have personal participation in the infringement thus breaching unfair competition laws under the California Business and Professional Code? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found that Visa cannot be held liable for copyright infringement because their involvement as the financial payment service is not a material or strong enough contribution. Also, their involvement was distinctively different than that of cases where the defendant was found guilty in similar charges. Visa also cannot be held liable for infringement because they did not show “clear expression” or “affirmative acts” in their intent to help the infringement. |
|
|
Term
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg and Guns are We
26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (1998) |
|
Definition
New York District Court
Summary: Toys “R” Us and Geoffrey, Inc. sued Feinberg for his internet domain name “gunsareus.com,” stating that he violated the Lanham Act and New York commercial and trademark laws. The case started and ended in the district court in New York. The plaintiff, Toys "R" Us"'s summary judgment was denied and the defendant, Feinberg's, summary judgment was granted. Therefore, the conclusion is in favor of the defendant. The issues in this case were is the trademark for Toys “R” Us used by Feinberg as a way to gain sales on his part, in turn confusing customers that he may be affiliated with the company Toys “R” Us, creating unfair competition? Is the domain name used by Feinberg confusing customers to think it is related to Toys “R” Us? The court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating there was no confusion in the domain name. They also ruled that it would be unlikely for customers to think Toys “R” Us sponsored or affiliated with the small store based on the names Feinberg used for his store. Judge Schwartz’s reasoning for his decision is that the defendant did not use the “R” in Toys “R” Us that is essentially their trademark. The court also noted that Feinberg’s target group of consumers is firearm dealers, which is completely different from Toys “R” Us target consumers. This case helped set the standard for future trademark issues. |
|
|
Term
Hasbro v Clue Computing
No. CIV. A. 97-10065-DPW. |
|
Definition
This case is about a disagreement over the use of the word “clue” in the Internet domain name for Clue Computing Inc. CLUE has been a registered name of the popular Hasbro murder mystery board game since 1950, and the company has used the CLUE trademark to build a brand around the game. The company Clue Computing Inc, a computer consulting business, registered the domain name of “clue.com” to use for their company’s website, offering information about their company. The domain name was approved by the Internet Network Information Center, an internet agency that was chosen by Clue Computing Inc, to help them obtain a domain name for their website. Hasbro, who had the registered trademark CLUE for it’s well known board game of the same name, informed the Internet Network Information Center that they had trademark of the work “clue”, and the Network Information Center in turn informed Clue Computing Inc, that their domain name, “clue.com”, would be shut down. Clue Computing Inc, then sued the Network Information Center and won an injunction towards the impending termination of their domain name “clue.com”. Hasbro followed by suing Clue Computing for infringement against the CLUE trademark. Clue Computing Inc sued the Internet Network Information Center in a Colorado state court and won, allowing them to keep their domain name. Hasbro responded by suing Clue Computing Inc, in a federal district court in Massachusetts for infringement and dilution of the word “clue” under the “Federal Lanham Act” and “the Massachusetts Anti-Dilution Act”. The issues in this case were if Clue Computing Inc, has the right to use the word “clue” in their Internet domain name? Does Clue Computing Inc.’s use of the word “clue” in “clue.com” violate Hasbro’s trademark of the word “clue” under the Federal Lanham Act and the Massachusetts Anti-Dilution Act?
The district court ruled in favor of Clue Computing Inc, because Hasbro had “failed to establish that Clue’s use of the domain actually diluted the distinctiveness of the CLUE mark". Hasbro did not have a “nationwide monopoly in the use of the rather common word”. |
|
|
Term
WorldSport Networks v Arinternet S.A.
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17 |
|
Definition
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Summary: The plaintiff, WorldSport Networks Ltd., was the corporation maintaining the official website of the General Association of the International Sports Federations. This official website was found at WORLDSPORT.com, while the defendant (Artinternet S.A.) registered and used the domain worldsports.com, creating confusion and competition between the two. WorldSport Networks sued Artinternet S.A. for trademark infringement and unfair competition. The plaintiff asked the court for an injunction against the defendant, which would enjoin the conflicting domain name worldsports.com. The defendant admitted their actions infringed the trademark, and the court ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from using Worldsport or any other similar name, word, or term in a domain name in connection with promotion of their goods, services, or web sites. The order also stated that they cannot engage in conduct likely to cause confusion among consumers wondering if the defendant’s good and services are affiliated with Worldsport, or participate in activities that damage Worldsport’s goodwill. The court also specified that Network Solutions, Inc., which registers domain names, must register worldsports.com to the plaintiff, and that NSI should not permit the registration of similar names or terms to anyone except the plaintiff. The issues are is the motion to intervene timely? Does the nonparty have a sufficient interest in the litigation? Would the nonparty’s rights be affected by the action’s disposition? Were the nonparty’s interests adequately represented by an existing party? This one is confusing. I'm going to finish it soon |
|
|
Term
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v Stiffel Co.
376 U.S. 225 (1964) |
|
Definition
U.S District Court for the Northern District of Illinois > U.S. Court of Appeals > U.S. Supreme Court
Summary: The Respondent, Stiffel, Co., was a lamp manufacturer who obtained mechanical and design patents for a “pole lamp” the company had invented. The lamps were an instant market success. However, the Respondent did not obtain federal patents, and therefore the lamps were not protected under federal law. Soon after the Respondent brought the lamp to market, the Petitioner, Sears, Roebuck & Co., began selling a similar lamp of almost identical design.The Respondent brought action against the Petitioner alleging “patent infringement” and “confusion of trade” therefore violating the unfair competition law of Illinois. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of the Plaintiff (Stiffel, Co.) . The court enjoined the Defendant (Sears, Roebuck & Co.) from selling the lamps and ordered damages based on the Plaintiff’s lost revenue be rendered by the Defendant for violating the Illinois unfair competition law. Despite that ruling however the court ruled the patents invalid. The court stated that there were invalid due to “want of invention”. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals. The appeals court reasoned that the Appellee (Stiffel, Co) need not show evidence of the infringement, but only needed to prove “confusion as to the source of it’s products”. So the trial court ruling was upheld based on the likelihood of confusion. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Petitioner (Sears, Roebuck & Co.), thus reversing the previous rulings. The issues of this case were can a state’s unfair competition law forbid the manufacture of a replicate item that is not protected under a federal patent or copyright and can a state’s unfair competition law, despite consistency with federal patent laws, allow for the Respondent to impose a liability? The U.S. Supreme court reasoned that the Respondent was unable to use the Illinois unfair competition law to bring action against the Petitioner because of the conflict between the state and federal laws. Being that this was an unpatented item based on federal law, the item would therefore be considered public domain although the state may require certain disclosures to prevent deception. There was also confliction between the state law and the federal government’s exclusive right to grant patents. The judge, Justice Hugo Black, reviewed the history of patents during the trial and concluded that once an item’s patent has expired or an item is considered to be unpatentable, then it is considered to be of public domain. He also stated that a state does not have the right to extend a patent’s life beyond its expiration. Justice Black cited Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (1938). |
|
|
