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Definition
| A situation that occurs when we find ourselves confronted with two beliefs that both seem to be true, but that also seem to involve a logical contradiction (in which case they cannot both be true). |
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Term
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Definition
| A paradox involving the beliefs 1) that we are free to choose our actions, and 2) that every event (including every action) follows necessarily from certain causal conditions. Various types of compatibilism and incompatibilism are attempts to resolve this paradox. |
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Term
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Definition
| A theory which says that the future is fixed by the past, so that there is only one (causally) possible way for the history of the world to unfold. If compatibilists are right, then determinism is compatible with free will. If incompatibilists (including hard determinists, indeterminists and libertarians) are right, it is not. |
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Term
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Definition
| An event can be thought of as something that happens in time. Whereas physical events happen in time and space, and are publically observable, mental events (e.g. sensations, beliefs, desires) are directly observable only by the people in whose minds they occur. |
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Term
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Definition
| We say of one event (A) that it is the cause of another event (B) if the occurrence of the one event (A) is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the other (B) happening. For example, flipping the light switch (A) ordinarily causes the lights to come on (B), though it is possible to imagine an event that might prevent this from happening (e.g. a power outage). |
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Definition
| In philosophy, an agent is someone who performs an action. |
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Term
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Definition
| An action is an event that we ordinarily think of as being caused by an agent (i.e. someone who acts) or else by his/her mental states (beliefs, desires, decisions or impulses). |
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Term
| causal factors of actions |
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Definition
| Factors that help to explain why someone acts the way they do. These might include genetic factors (e.g. depression and other genetically inherited predispositions), chemical factors (e.g. medication or lack of medication, alcohol or drug intoxication or dependency), psychological factors (e.g. personality traits, past experiences), cultural factors (e.g. social norms, religious beliefs), and/or environmental factors (e.g. role models, economic circumstances). |
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Term
| principle of sufficient reason |
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Definition
| A basic philosophical principle which says that anything that happens does so for a definite reason. |
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Term
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Definition
| The belief that determinism and free will are incompatible, so that either A) determinism is true and free will is an illusion, or B) determinism is false and free will is not an illusion. |
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Definition
| Hard determinists believe that 1) determinism is incompatible with free will, 2) determinism is true, 3) free will is an illusion. |
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Definition
| Like hard determinism, a form of incompatibilism. Indeterminists agree with hard determinists that 1) determinism is incompatible with free will, but they believe that 2) determinism is false (because some events don’t have causes), and 3) the acts that we freely perform are uncaused. |
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Definition
| The idea that we can be held morally accountable for our actions because they somehow originate in our will, and can therefore be attributed to us. |
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Definition
| Like indeterminists, libertarians are incompatibilists. Unlike indeterminists, libertarians argue that, in order for an agent to be morally responsible for his (or her) action, he must himself be the cause of that action (rather than his/her action being uncaused). |
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Term
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Definition
| A term used by libertarians to refer to special causal powers that beings with free will have that other kinds of things don’t have, and that makes these beings (i.e. free agents) morally accountable for their actions. |
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Term
| compatibilism (traditional) |
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Definition
| A philosophical theory which says that belief in free will and belief in determinism are compatible as long as “free” does not mean “uncaused,” but “caused by the agent’s own desires.” In other words, we can be said to be free as long as our actions are caused by our own desires, and we are not forced to act “against our will.” |
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Term
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Definition
| A modified version of compatibilism which differs from traditional compatibilism in holding that our will is genuinely free only if we act on our own authentic desires, which are ones that we ourselves have chosen and are “truly ours” |
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