Term
Smith v. Stone (third parties carried D onto P's land) |
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Definition
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Term
Markley v. Whitman (D stood behind P knowing that others would rush into him) |
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Definition
L Voluntary act of putting oneself in a position knowing that he would be pushed and the P would be harmed |
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Term
Laidlaw v. Sage (D moved P, his clerk, into position where he would be human shield against explosion about to be set off by extortionist bomber) |
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Definition
NL No voluntary act because D was "emotionally carried" to do as he did |
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Term
Lobert v. Pack (D, sleeping passenger, kicked car seat causing P to wreck) |
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Definition
NL D didn't know act of going to sleep would put in a position to cause harm as Markley D did |
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Term
Vosburg v. Putnam (after teacher called class to order, D student deliberately kicked P, who was a classmate) |
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Definition
L Kick was delivered in class after teacher had called it to order. Maybe okay on schoolyard, but not here. Act + Desire + Harm = Battery |
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Term
Hennessey v. Pyne (D unintentionally struck P with golf shot) |
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Definition
NL No desire to touch P, though some idea touching may occur? |
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Term
Knight v. Jewett (D, in touch football game, intentionally ran over P and accidentally stepped on her finger) |
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Definition
NL No intent (desire/ substantial certainty) |
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Term
Ellis v. D'Angelo (D, who was a child, pushed adult P down) |
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Definition
L Intent to touch, being a kid doesn't save you |
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Term
Guzy v. Gandel (D, who was a child, hugged P, his babysitter, causing her to fall down) |
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Definition
NL Intent to touch, but no offensive desire or substantial certainty will fall |
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Term
Garratt v. Dailey (D 5yo child moved P's intended chair knowing that she would strike the ground) |
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Definition
L Kid knew with substantial certainty what would happen |
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Term
McGuire v. Almy (D, who was person with mental illness, deliberately struck P, her nurse, with lowboy leg) |
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Definition
L Act, intention (desire, substantial certainty), harmful contact Policy: gives incentives for family or parents to make sure these batteries don't happen |
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Term
Manning v. Grimsley (D pitcher, who was warming up in bullpen, aimed baseball at hecklers, but accidentally hit P, who was sitting behind wire mesh fence) |
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Definition
L Transferred intent from assault to battery |
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Term
Maytnier v. Rush (D pitcher threw wild pitch and hit P) |
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Definition
NL No intention (desire or substantial certainty) |
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Term
Bennight v. Western Auto Supply (D's manager sent P, his employee, into bat-infested rear section of warehouse where bats ultimately came into contact with her) |
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Definition
L Speech can be act, ordered employee to go to bats with substantial certainty that she would be assaulted, transferred intent to battery when she was attacked |
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Term
Mohr v. Williams (P had given consent to operation on right ear, but D operated on her left ear after she was under general anesthetic) |
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Definition
L Offensive because she had not consented and not life threatening |
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Term
Collins v. Wilcock (police officer, disobeying rules of arrest, grabbed criminal D'a arm in order to restrain her and simultaneously accused her of soliciting men [on order of officer for battery]) |
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Definition
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Term
Morgan v. Pistone (D doctor angrily touched P who had called him a quack and told her he did not like that name) |
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Definition
NL Touch was to get attention, not offensive by reasonable standards |
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Term
Thomas-Kincannon-Elkin Drug v. Hendrix (D's pharmacist secretly put ex-lax into malt, which D offered to P to drink and which P did drink) |
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Definition
L Certainty that harmful touching would occur |
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Term
White v. University of Idaho (D university's music professor snuck up behind P, a student, and played concert piano rift on her back[for university) |
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Definition
L Not reasonably okay to touch in this manner (exceeded bounds of social relations) |
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Term
Matorano v. Bloomingdale's (perfume spray) |
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Definition
L Offensive spray to face, no malice, but hard contact |
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Term
Madden v. D.C. Transit System (D's bus emitted oily fumes that came into contact with body of P, a pedestrian) |
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Definition
NL Not hard contact and no malice |
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Term
Leichtman v.WLW Jacor Communications (one of radio station's on-air hosts encouraged another host to blow cigar smoke into face of P, who was invited anti-smoking spokesperson) |
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Definition
L No hard contact, but malice and offensive |
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Term
Morgan v. Loyacomo (D manager falsely accused P of shoplifting and grabbed package that P was carrying under arm) |
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Definition
L Don't need to touch person, sufficient to touch something touching person |
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Term
Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp (D employer instructed P employees to clean up toxic mess, which they did) |
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Definition
L Substantial certainty that harmful touching would occur. |
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Term
Bennan v. Parsonnet (P asked D surgeon to operate on left groin, but after P was under general anesthetic instead operated on right groin, which was dangerously diseased) |
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Definition
NL Consent implied in law because life-saving |
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Term
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship (D physician gave immigrant smallpox inoculation after she held out her arm for it after being told she could not enter U.S. without it) |
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Definition
NL Consent implied in fact of holding out arm |
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Term
Mink v. University of Chicago (D gave P's DES pills without telling P's that pills were experimental and that D was using them as test subjects) |
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Definition
L Offensive because reasonable person would regard it as such. Consent was given for prenatal care, this went way beyond consent. |
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Term
McCue v. Klein (D's gave P, a known alcoholic, three pints of whiskey, and the third pint, which he willingly consumed, killed him) |
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Definition
L Substantial certainty harmful touching would occur like Thomas-Kincannon-Elkin Drug |
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Term
Rains v. Superior Court (D's falsely told P's, who were psych patients, that D's had to beat them in order to make them well, and P's consented to beatings under this deception) |
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Definition
L Doctors used their authority for their own purposes |
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Term
Freedman v. Superior Court (D obstetricians deceptively told P that the drug Pitocin prevented infection and that she should ask for it at hospital; Pitocin actually labor-inducing drug) |
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Definition
NL Obstetrician used tricked patient into asking for Pitocin for own purposes, but could have been legitimate purpose and P didn't present evidence to contrary) |
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Term
Bowman v. Home Life Insurance (D's field underwriter falsely claimed that he was a physician and performed intimate examination of P's) |
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Definition
L Agent used authority to commit offensive touching for own purposes |
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Term
Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rick (D's non-medical employee, a former prize fight trainer, set P's are despite her protests) |
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Definition
L P did not consent and it wasn't life-saving |
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Term
De May v. Roberts (D doctor brough along bachelor friend who held P's hand while she was giving birth) |
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Definition
L Implied consent in fact was given through deceit |
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Term
Cohen v. Smith (P's, husband and wife, told D's hospital's doctors that because of their religion, they did not want wife's unclothed body to be seen or touched by any male, but depsite these instructions D's male nurse did see and touch P's wife's unclothed body) |
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Definition
L Explicitly did not give consent |
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Term
Hudson v. Craft (P, who was minor, nominally consented to illegal prize fight organized by D, and then P was struck and hurt by other fighter) |
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Definition
L Although implied consent in P (minor), fight was illegally held |
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Term
Taylor v. Hesser (P signed D's release of liability and then was struck and hurt at D's paintball field after P removed his goggles in violation of D's rules) |
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Definition
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Term
Richard v. Mangian (D, a minor, repeatedly struck and kicked P, another minor, after P showed up at rope swing to fight D) |
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Definition
NL Implied consent in fact from showing up to fight |
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