Term
| When does a firm have an affirmative duty to deal? |
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Definition
| 1) Under the Essential facilities doctrine OR 2) When the refusal to deal is predatory and not justified by any business decision (Aspen skiing) |
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Term
| How is single firm predatory conduct analyzed? |
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Definition
1. Predatory conduct
2. With the intent to monopolize AND
3. Likelihood that the conduct will lead to monopoly power |
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Term
| If the predatory conduct is single-firm pricing how can a plaintiff prove a likelihood of monopoly? |
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Definition
| A plaintiff must show a likelihood that the monopolist will be able to recoup their "investment in either price cutting (Brooke Group) or Price raising (Weyerhasuer) |
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Term
| When does product "tying" create antitrust liability? |
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Definition
1) The seller has appreciable market power
2) The arrangment effects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product market
3) The two products are distinct from one another (Meaning there is sufficient demand for either product separately)
4) The sale of one product must be tied to the purchase of another |
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Term
| When is tying illegal per se? |
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Definition
| When the actor is a monopoly in the tying market (International Salt) |
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Term
| What are the two approaches to bundling? |
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Definition
Bundling can be predatory if there is market power for one of the products and competitors cannot match the product bundle (3rd circ, 3M). OR
Taking into account the entire bundle, the products are being sold below cost, the actor can recoup his below cost sales and the PTF can prove anticompetitive effects |
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Term
| General rule for an exclusive contract |
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Definition
| An exclusive contract will violate the Sherman Act ONLY if substantially forecloses competition in the relevant market. |
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Term
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Definition
| Exclusive contract that cut out a price cutter but allowed two other distributors was not a horizontal conspiracy, nor did it substantially foreclose competition in the relevant market. |
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Term
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Definition
| An exclusive requirements contract was not a violation of Section 1 because it did not substantially foreclose trade in the Florida-Georgia market. |
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Term
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Definition
| Exclusive contract WAS a violation because defendant controlled 67% of market and threats to cut out dealers had real effects foreclosing competition. |
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