Term
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Definition
| - Scottsboro boys - RTC in all capital cases state/fed |
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Term
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Definition
| In federal crimes, rtc in all cases |
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Term
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Definition
| refused to expand rtc to states |
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Term
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Definition
| (transcripts) - can't discriminate via poverty |
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Term
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Definition
| Right to counsel as we know it. |
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Term
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Definition
| juvenile cases where juvenile may lose freedom, due process 14th requires appointment of counsel |
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Term
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Definition
| Constitutional right to counsel in any case where you stand the chance of being imprisoned if convicted. |
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Term
| The 6th Amendment guarantees |
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Definition
| Interrogation phase, trial, sentencing, initial appeal |
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Term
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Definition
| pleas, waiver of trial, testify, whether to appeal |
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Term
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Definition
| witnesses, cross, voir dire, motions, evidence |
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Term
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Definition
| trial counsel's failure to ask for certain evidence does not equal ineffective assistance. Decisions of trial strategy up to attorney. |
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Term
| Faretta v. California (1975) |
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Definition
| state cannot force attorney upon someone when they knowingly intelligently waive the right to counsel. |
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Term
| McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) |
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Definition
| appointment of stand-by counsel over the objection of the defendant does not violate right to self-representaion |
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Term
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Definition
defense counsel
“No decision of this Court suggests that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points |
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Term
| Reviere v. State, (1998)(GA) |
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Definition
| a defendant cannot complain of lack of counsel when he chose not to have counsel |
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Term
| Weldon v. State (2000)(GA) |
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Definition
| No right of defendant to act as co-counsel |
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Term
| Walker v. State (2010)(GA) |
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Definition
| Competency hearing is only necessary when the court has reason to believe the defendant is incompetent, where defendant alleged he was incompetent to waive counsel |
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Term
| Lamar v. State (2004)(GA) |
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Definition
Defendant who chooses to go pro se waives right to counsel. Test is whether the waiver is knowing/voluntary/intelligent waiver. not hat they are capable of defending themselves.
1. Do they understand the nature of charges
2. Statutory or lesser included
3. Range of possible punishments 4. Possible defenses
5. Mitigating circumstances
6. Any other facts necessary for a broad understanding of matter |
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Term
| Winston v. State, (2004)(GA) |
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Definition
| on appeal the state bears the burden of demonstrating a valid waiver of counsel |
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Term
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Definition
| self representation is at def. own risk; 6th amendment doesn't require the trial court to give a thorough admonishment of regarding the usefulness of an attorney |
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Term
| Ga. Code. Ann. 17-6-1. Court can make bail when |
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Definition
defendant
poses no significant risk of flight, threat to community, committing another felony, or intimidating witnesses/obstructing justice. |
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Term
| . Coffin v. United States (1895) |
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Definition
| presumption of innocence lies in favor of the accused but has no bearing on the determination of rights of pretrial detainee |
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Term
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Definition
| jailhouse practices during pretrial detention did not deny due process |
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Term
| Rocco v. State (2004)(GA) |
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Definition
| a person on bond is in constructive custody of the state, therefore, conditions of bond are appropriate where reasonable. |
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Term
| . Gernstein v. Pugh (1975) |
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Definition
| presumption of innocence has no bearing on rights of pretrial detainee; pretrial probable cause hearing is not a guarantee |
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Term
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Definition
| pretrial detention is not considered punishment |
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Term
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Definition
| failure to comply with the statutory interlocutory appeal procedures required dismissal of direct appeal; (you must appeal bail interlocutory if available) |
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Term
| v. Myers v. St. Lawrence (2011)(GA) |
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Definition
| - petitioner not entitled to bail as a matter of right |
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Term
| Jones v. Grimes (1964)(GA) |
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Definition
| amount of bail to be assessed is at the discretion of the judge, and in absence of clear abuse of discreation, TOC |
|
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Term
| . Constantino v. Warren (2009)(GA) |
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Definition
| court can grant bail only if it finds non- existence of four factors by statute. |
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Term
| . Berger v. United States |
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Definition
| no prosecutor foul play. It is his duty to refrain from methods that will produce wrongful convictions. |
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Term
| Johnson v. State, (1988 GA) |
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Definition
| State can use contradictory theories against different defendants before different juries in separate trials. They must be supported by probable cause, however. |
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Term
| . State v. Perry, (2003 GA) |
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Definition
| It is the state, not the victim, who has an interest in pursuing criminal prosecutions |
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Term
| Robbins v. Lanier, (1991 GA) |
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Definition
| DA is protected by same immunity in civil cases that protects judges |
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Term
| Inmates of Attica Correctional facility v. Rockefeller (1973) |
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Definition
| a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted or threatened with prosecution. |
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Term
| . United States v. Armstrong, (1996) |
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Definition
| judiciary has no authority to review the governments choice of charge. To establish discrimination, defendant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted |
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Term
| United States v. Batchelder, (1979) |
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Definition
| the discretion of a prosecutor to choose between statutes with identical elements does not violate equal protection. |
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Term
| Hurtado v. California (1884) |
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Definition
| federal constitution does not require the state to adopt grand juries |
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Term
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Definition
| A preliminary hearing is not a required step in felony prosecution if the grand jury indicts prior to when a preliminary hearing would be required |
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Term
| Coleman v. Alabama, (1970) |
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Definition
| A preliminary hearing is not a required step in state prosecution, the prosecutor may seek an indictment without a preliminary hearing. |
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Term
| Gernstein v. Pugh, (1975) |
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Definition
| Judicial hearing not a prereq to prosecution by information |
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Term
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Definition
| the standard for evidence at a prelim. hearing is probable cause |
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Term
| . Bethel v. Fleming, (2011 GA) |
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Definition
| no constitutional right to confront witnesses at prelim. hearing. Hearsay is admissible and can establish probable cause. |
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Term
| Wood v. Georgia - (1962 U.S.) |
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Definition
| Grand jury is a security against hasty prosec. |
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Term
| Costello v. United States (1956) |
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Definition
| Indictments are not open to challenge on the grounds that they aren't supported by adequate evidence |
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Term
| . Falter v. United States (1928) |
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Definition
| Indictment is a charge of GJ, not plead of DA |
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Term
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Definition
No snacks. Grand jury is to determine if PC exists
the prosecutor has an obligation not to get favor with grand jurors |
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Term
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Definition
| Grand jury "not essential for due process" |
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Term
| Hobby v. United States (1984) |
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Definition
- Discrimination in the selection of the foreperson is distinguished from selection of grand jury.
Discrimination in the selection of a jury foreperson does not threaten interests of defendant protected by due process clause because his job is clerical in nature. |
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Term
| . Campbell v. Louisiana 1998 |
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Definition
| Juror foreperson case/3rd party standing to challenge jurors. 1) jury is tainted by race discrim. 2) relation to excluded jurors such that both have an interest in grand jury selection process 3) interest in the outcome (excluded can rarely challenge) |
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Term
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Definition
| In order to show an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury foreman selection, defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial under representation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. |
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Term
| . Beck v. Washington (1962) |
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Definition
| If a state chooses to use a grand jury system, it must provide an unbiased grand jury |
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Term
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Definition
| as a general rule, grand jury challenges must be made prior to return of indictment or it is deemed waived unless the defendant can show he had neither actual or constructive notice of the illegality. |
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Term
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
| Formal charge w/o hearing. |
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Term
| The basic functions of the charging document |
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Definition
1. Protect defendant's right against double jeopardy
2. Provide notice to defendant of charges
3. 6th amendment right to be informed
4. Providing a basis for judicial review
5. Providing a jurisdictional basis
6. Protecting the guarantee of grand jury review of accusations |
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Term
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Definition
challenges sufficiency of substance of indictment
1. The test for sufficiency is whether it contains the elements of the offense charged, apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to defend against, and protects against double jeopardy.
2. If the defendant can admit everything charged in the indictment and be innocent of a crime, the indictment is insufficient. |
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Term
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Definition
challenges the sufficiency of the form of indictment
1. Attacking whether the indictment is strictly sufficient.
2. An allegation that an indictment is deficient because it does not contain all essential elements of the crime, for example, is a special dem. |
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Term
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Definition
| failure to file demurrer seeking additional information before pleading not guilty to the indictment constitutes a waiver to be tried on a perfect indictment |
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Term
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Definition
| The exact words of the indictment do not need to be proved "god damn all white people ought to be killed" "damn you and your wife and children too." |
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Term
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Definition
| The test for sufficiency is whether it contains the elements of the offense charged, apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to defend against, and protects against double jeopardy. |
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Term
| Freeman v. state (GA 1990 |
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Definition
| Bill of particulars not valid in GA |
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Term
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Definition
- Fatal Variance It is error to charge the jury that a crime may be committed by alternative methods when the indictment charges a specific method.
- If there's a reasonable chance that the jury convicted the def. of the crime in a manner not charged in the indictment, then that conviction is defective. |
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Term
| . United States v. Carll (1881) |
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Definition
| - It's not enough to copy+paste the statute into the indictment unless the words of the statute fully sets forth all elements. |
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Term
| Roscoe v. State, (GA 2011) |
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Definition
| fatal variance test narrowed, gives birth to "such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused." |
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Term
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Definition
| State: Same county, Fed: Same state, as offense. |
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Term
| Change of venue up to the discretion of |
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Definition
| the trial judge, absent abuse of discretion. Standard: prejudice against the defendant so great as to render the trial unfair. |
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Term
| Two reasons you can transfer under FRCP 21 |
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Definition
a. For Prejudice - no way to get a fair trial in location
b. For convenience - any district that's more convenient to parties |
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Term
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Definition
| guy who blew up a bunch of judges in GA, entire north district recused itself. Transferred venue to Minnesota. |
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Term
| U.S. v. Rodriguez-Moreno (1999) |
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Definition
| studying the "key verbs" that define an offense is helpful in determining venue in doubtful cases, however, there is no rigid test. |
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Term
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Definition
| Venue is more than a mere procedural nicety, it is a constitutional requirement. Proof of venue is required in all cases, |
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Term
| . Melton v. State - (GA 2006) |
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Definition
| - A reversal on grounds of insuff. venue is a question of procedure, so retrial is not barred by double jeopardy. |
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Term
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Definition
| venue is defined as the locality in which criminal charges will be brought and adjudicated. |
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Term
| . King v. State (GA 2005) |
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Definition
| Venue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, GA const. requires that |
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Term
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Definition
| Trial courts will order a change of venue for death penalty trials in those cases in which a defendant can make a substantive showing of the likelihood of prejudice by reason of extensive publicity. Trial court can reserve ruling until voir dire responses. |
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Term
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Definition
| Prosecutor is minister of justice, don't abuse power! |
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Term
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Definition
| Prosecutors do justice, not win cases. Higher ethical standard |
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Term
| Federal Rule 8 Joinder of offense |
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Definition
| the indictment my charge a defendant in separate counts with two or more offenses if the offenses charged...are of the same and similar character, based on the same act or transaction, or are connected in a common plan. |
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Term
| Federal Rule 8 Joinder of defendants |
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Definition
| the indictment may charge 2 defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction constituting an offense |
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Term
| Jackson v. State (GA 2005) |
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Definition
| Where two offenses are joined based on: same conduct, series of acts, or acts part of a single plan. Trial court should sever offenses if it promotes a fair determination of guilt or innocence as to each offense |
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Term
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Definition
justification for liberal rule of joinder is the economy of a single trial. Arguments against joinder are
1. Defendant may become confounded in presenting separate defenses
2. The jury may use the evidence of one crime to infer he'd commit others
3. The jury may cumulate evidence of the various crimes to find guilt |
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Term
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Definition
| "Same elements" test. Whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other. If so, then the offenses are separate and do not violate double jeopardy. Established in Blockburger v. U.S. (1932) |
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Term
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Definition
), A defendant seeking severance must show clearly that he will be prejudice by a joint trial. Factors to consider are:
1. Whether a joint trial will create confusion as to law and evidence
2. Whether there is a danger that evidence admissible against one def. will be improperly considered against the other
3. Whether the defendants are asserting antagonistic defenses. |
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Term
| Bruton v. United States (1968) |
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Definition
A def.'s 6th amend. confrontation right is violate when
1. Co-defs are tried jointly; and
2. One co-def confession is used to implicate the other; and
3. The co-def. who made the implicating statement employs his 5th, and thus can't be crossed about the statement. |
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Term
| Benton v. Maryland (1969) |
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Definition
| Double jeopardy protection enforceable against states |
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Term
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Definition
| Collateral estoppel - When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties. This has become federal criminal law as well (5th) |
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Term
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Definition
| Instruction for voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense of malice murder wasn't supported by evidence, evidence of lesser included must exist. |
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Term
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Definition
1. Did pretrial delay create presumption of prejudice?
a. Generally, one year is enough to create presumption
2. Four factor test
a. Whether the delay was uncommonly long
b. Whether the govt or the def. was to blame
c. Whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right
d. Whether the defendant suffered prejudice
i. Oppressive pretrial incarceration
ii. Anxiety and concerns of def.
iii. Defense was impaired. |
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Term
| Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) |
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Definition
| Right to speedy trial just as fundamental as other 6th amendment protections |
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Term
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Definition
First step of speedy trial analysis is to decide whether the pretrial delay has been sufficiently long to create the presumption of prejudice. If no prejudice is found, the analysis stops there.
*For serious crimes that do not involve unusual complexities, one year usually makes it presumptively prejudicial. |
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Term
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Definition
| A nolle pros. does not act as an acquittal or bar future prosecution. The state has authority to re-indict. |
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Term
| SPEEDY TRIAL ACT/GA SPEEDY TRIAL PROVISION |
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Definition
| Federal govt. bound by this. Indictment must be filed 30 days from arrest, trial must commence 70 days from the date of indictment or court appearance. requires filing a "demand for speedy trial" |
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Term
| . GA 17-7-170 - Defendant in non-death penalty case may enter a demand for |
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Definition
speedy trial at the court term at which an indictment or accusation is filed.
i. In non-death cases - failure to trial at that proceeding or the next results in acquittal.
ii. In death penalty, If not tried in two terms, full acquittal. |
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Term
| Jencks Act and Jencks v. U.S. |
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Definition
| . Jencks act held that in any criminal pros. brought by U.S., no statement or report in possession of the united states which was made by a govt. witness or prospective govt. witness (other than def.) shall be subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct. |
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Term
| . Brady v. Maryland (1963) |
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Definition
| prosecutor can't withold evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce penalty of def. Violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith |
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Term
| Giglio v. United States (1972) |
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Definition
| Expands Brady, when the reliability of a witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, non-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within the general rule established in Brady |
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Term
| . Overton v. State, (GA 2008) |
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Definition
| Brady doesn't require them to get butt naked in pretrial discovery, and is not violated if the material in question is provided at trial |
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Term
| . Overton v. State, (GA 2008) |
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Definition
| Brady doesn't require them to get butt naked in pretrial discovery, and is not violated if the material in question is provided at trial |
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Term
| Wardius v. Oregon, (1973) |
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Definition
Due process clause does not force states to adopt discovery procedures, just that they adopt fair ones.
*Alibi rules must provide for reciprocal discovery, if not, then error |
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Term
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Definition
| No general constitutional right to discovery in criminal case. |
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Term
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Definition
The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than 10 days prior to trial, disclose to the defendant and make available for inspection, copying, or photographing any relevant written or recorded statements made by the def.
- any statement of any witness that is in possession, custody, control of the state or def. that relates to the subject matter concering statement of the witness.
- Witness lists with exception for good reason.
- Written scientific reports
The burden is on the defendant asserting a discovery violation to show harm and error |
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Term
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Definition
| Appellant has the burden of proving trial court error by the appellate record, and must compile a complete record of what transpired in the trial court. Otherwise, there is not enough info for an appellate court to review. |
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Term
| Harris v. State (GA 1985) |
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Definition
| It's the trial court's discretion to accept a plea, def. not entitled to a plea as a matter of right. |
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Term
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Definition
| conditional pleas no longer allowed in GA |
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Term
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Definition
| Several constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place with a plea of guilty. Privilege against self incrimination, right to jury trial, right of confrontation. |
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Term
| . Bazemore v. State (GA 2000) |
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Definition
| once the petitioner raises a question about validity of a guilty plea, the state has the burden to show the pleas was voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made. |
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Term
| Bordinkircher v. Hayes, (1978) |
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Definition
| Plea bargaining constitutionally permissible, levying a greater charge to persuade the defendant to plead guilty is okay. This isn't vindictive punishment because both sides have something to gain. |
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Term
| Santobello v. New York, (1971) |
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Definition
Bait 'n switch", Ole Santo took a plea offer, a different prosecutor showed up to the sentencing hearing and recommended MAX. This was not okay, because they agreed on a sentence.
*ABUSE OF DISCRETION is the standard for plea withdrawal
* It's within the trial courts discretion to accept a withdrawal prior to the end of the term of court |
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Term
| Newnan v. United States (1967) |
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Definition
| "All deals are not created equal" co-def not entitled to same plea, no violation of equal protection. |
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Term
| . United States v. Ruiz (2002) |
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Definition
| A guilty plea under a plea agreement, with waiver of rights, can be accepted as knowing and voluntary. |
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Term
| Brady v. United States (1970) |
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Definition
| "plea brady' - Agents may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion. A plea will stand unless induced by threats, misrepresentation, or by improper promises (bribes) |
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Term
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Definition
| UCR 33.10 requires that the trial court inform the defendant that he has a right to withdraw his guilty plea if the court intends to reject a negotiated plea. |
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Term
| . Teemer v. State (GA 2010) |
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Definition
| Defendant was not advised that he would have to serve his ten year prison term without possibility of parole. Eligibility is not a consequence of a guilty plea, and defendant signed waiver saying his atty explained everything to him. Valid guilty plea. |
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Term
| . Bazemore v. State (GA 2000) |
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Definition
| State fucked up, no explanation of rights. on record. Invalid guilty plea. |
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Term
| Rosser v. State (GA 2005) |
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Definition
| withdrawing a guilty plea after entering an "open- ended" plea does not require the judge to comply with UCR applicable to negotiated pleas. (required announcements, etc) |
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Term
| North California v. Alford, (1970) |
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Definition
| Guilty plea which represented voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives available to defendant was not compelled merely because he took the plea to avoid the death penalty. |
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Term
| . Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) |
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Definition
| Right to jury trial is granted to prevent oppression by the govt, and applies to all "serious" offenses. Court focused on potential, not actual sentence to determine seriousness |
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Term
| Williams v. Florida (1970) |
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Definition
| The right of jury trial does not mean a jury has to be composed of 12 people,. Florida's 6-man juries didn't violate 6th/14th. |
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Term
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Definition
| Georgia statute that restricted traffic offenses to bench trials unconstitutional due to potential misdemeanor punishment. |
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Term
| Apodaca v. Oregon, (1972) |
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Definition
| The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not require verdicts to be unanimous, nor is unanimity required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that racial minorities not be excluded from the jury. |
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Term
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Definition
| "porn case", Jury of less than 6 violates 6th/14th |
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Term
| Watkins v. State (GA 2004) |
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Definition
| Jury charges don't have to follow a pattern, so long as they correctly and clearly state the law. No entitlement to charge on nullification |
|
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Term
| . Burch v. Louisiana (1979) |
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Definition
| Non-unanimous conviction of 6 person Jury (5/6) violated right to trial by jury. |
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Term
| Arnold v. State (GA 1997) |
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Definition
| An accused my not be judicially punished for exercising her constitutionally guaranteed right to trial. Once you go to trial though, it opens the door for all sorts of aggravating details of the offense. |
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Term
| Singer v. United States (1965) |
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Definition
| no constitutional right to bench trial |
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Term
| Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) |
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Definition
| 6th Amendment requires juries to represent a cross-section of the community. Women, as a class, can't be automatically exempted. |
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Term
|
Definition
| In order to establish violation of "cross-section", def must show 1. group is distinctive, 2. representation in venire is unfair, 3. this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in jury selection. |
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Term
| Batson v. Kentucky (1986) |
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Definition
Three part process to evaluate a claim that the use of peremptory strikes by a party was racially motivated and in violation of the const.
1. The opponent must make prima-facie showing of racial discrimination
2. The proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation
3. The court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven
a. This applies to defense use of peremptories too. |
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Term
|
Definition
| A defendant has standing to challenge race base exclusion regardless of race, under the equal protection clause. |
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Term
| Nelson v. State, (GA 2008) |
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Definition
| Batson does not extend to peremptory strikes based on national origin (really? what the fuck. It's okay to be facist, not racist) |
|
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Term
| . Georgia v. McCollum (1992) |
|
Definition
| State has standing to challenge defendants use of discriminatory peremptory challenges. |
|
|
Term
| . J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B |
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Definition
| gender strikes just as bad as race. |
|
|
Term
| . Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) |
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Definition
| Jurors can't be disqualified from jury service simply because of general objection to the death penalty, or expressed religious concerns. The State can exclude those jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty, and those who would consider it in guilt/innocence. |
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Term
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Definition
| - replaced witherspoon (so who gives a fuck about witherspoon) with a test requiring the judge to determine if the juror's attitude toward the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair" their ability to decide on sentence fairly |
|
|
Term
| . Gitlow v. New York (1925) |
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Definition
| 14th + 1st = applicable to the states, specifically provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press. |
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Term
| Richmond News v. Virginia (1980) |
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Definition
| Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public (1st + 14th) |
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Term
| Bridges v. California (1941) |
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Definition
| The liklihood however great that evil will result, cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press. The evil itself must be substantial. |
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Term
|
Definition
Stands for several propositions
1. The court shall ask questions of jurors with expressed opinions of guilt
2. It is sufficient to qualify a juror if that juror can lay aside his impression
3. The challenger must show the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of a juror as will raise the presumption of partiality
4. Impartiality is not a technical conception, it's a state of mind. There is no formula or test to determine it exactly |
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Term
|
Definition
pre-trial publicity/change of venue case. Two applicable standards
1. The actual prejudice standard
2. The presumed prejudice standard
i. rarely applicable. Pre-trial media blitz must "pervade and saturate" the community rendering a fair trial and impartial jury "virtually impossible"
presumed prejudice must be rebutted or results in a venue change. |
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Term
| Walden v. State (GA 2011) |
|
Definition
Abuse of discretion is the standard for motions for a change of venue. When death is sought, the petitioner must show
1. The setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial
i. (publicity extensive, factually incorrect, inflammatory, hostile)
2. The jury selection process showed actual prejudice to render a fair trial impossible
ii. review voir dire |
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Term
| . United States v. Brown (2000) |
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Definition
| Upheld gag order to keep parties, witnesses, and attorneys from talking about case. Due to the substantial liklihood of such comments tainting the jury pool. |
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Term
| Edmonds v. State (GA 2002) |
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Definition
| The single purpose of voir dire is to ascertain the impartiality of jurors, and their ability to treat the cause on the merits objectively. |
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Term
| Sellers v. Burrowes (GA 2007) |
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Definition
| The trial judge is the only person in a courtroom whose primary duty is to ensure the selection of an impartial jury; because of this, trial courts have broad discretion to determine impartiality |
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Term
| Hubbard v. State (GA 2005) |
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Definition
| Only in the event of MANIFEST ABUSE will the courts discretion be upset upon review. |
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Term
| Keating v. State (GA 2011) |
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Definition
| trial court has discretion over scope of voir dire |
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Term
| Wilkins v. State, Starks v. State, Cherry v. State |
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Definition
| the purpose of voir dire is to elicit possible prejudice and bias. The trial court has broad discretion to limit scope of voir dire with regard to abstract or technical legal matters, because a jury charge is more appropriate in those cases |
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Term
| Sallie v. State (GA 2003) |
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Definition
| Questions asking the juror to prejudge are not allowed, however, since there's a fine line between that and bias, the trial judge has practically unlimited discretion. Hooray. |
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Term
| Vaughn v. State (GA 2006) |
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Definition
| The trial court should not communicate with the jury on any subject, other than issues regarding the jury's convenience and comfort, outside the presence of the defendant and his attorney. Unless the character of the communication clearly shows it could not have been prejudicial, the presumption is that it is prejudicial requiring another trial. |
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Term
| Taylor v. State (GA 2009) |
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Definition
| Defendant has a constitutional right to be present during all portions of her trial and her absence during a critical stage, without waiver, constitutes a violation of her right to present which is presumed prejudicial. |
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Term
| Estelle v. William (1976) |
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Definition
| Presumption of innocence is huge deal, courts must carefully guard against the dilution of the principle that guilt is established by probative evidence. You must object to prison garb. "A defendant may not remain silent and willingly go to trial in prison garb and thereafter claim error" |
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Term
| . Illinois v. Allen (1970) |
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Definition
A defendant can lose his right to be present if he's acting like a goddamned animal after being warned. Standard: "so disorderly that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom." Guess who has a shitton of discretion to determine this :O.
*There at least 3 constitutionally permissable ways to handle a shitler def.
1. Bind and gag him/keeping him present, 2. Cite him for contempt, 3. Put him in timeout until he promises to act normally. (this is seriously an option) |
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Term
| Daniels v. State (GA 2011) |
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Definition
| Well established that the accused should be free of indicia of guilt such as shackles, prison garb, or being surrounded by uniformed security. |
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Term
| . Jivens v. State (GA 1994) |
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Definition
| defendant defecated on the table, telling sheriff's deputy "that's what he thought of the court" and he removed all of his clothes. They shackled him and put him in prison garb. No abuse of discretion |
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Term
| . Young v. State (GA 1998) |
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Definition
| Taserbelt case. Def. was forced to wear an RACC belt. It could fuck his shit up. He argued that prejudiced the jury, court found that it didn't. Sur-fucking-prise. |
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Term
| GA has a statutory right to remain silent |
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Definition
a. It's broader than the USC, including testimony that would "tend to incriminate, bring infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon such party or party's family member." It also says you can't be forced to give evidence against yourself. DA can compel you to speak at a Grand Jury hearing, but, can't use any of it against you.
i. The immunity granted is "use and derivative" which means it only applies to the "fruits" of your testimony
ii. Transactional immunity is not recognized in GA. |
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Term
| Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) |
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Definition
| Def.'s counsel was denied ability to ask def. questions when he took the stand. (due to an archaic GA law.). SCOTUS reversed saying it was a violation of his 6th amendment RTC to prevent him from being asked questions by his own attorney. |
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Term
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Definition
| Right to testify on your behalf exists, but, code of conduct prohibits lawyer from allowing his client to perjure himself. Attorney said he'd seek to withdraw after client told him he was going to lie on the stand. This didn't deprive def. of his RTC because no prejudice was established. |
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Term
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Definition
Right to testify on your own behalf comes from due process of 14th, compulsory clause of 6th, and Fifths privilege against self- incrimination.
1. Arkansas per se' rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony is an arbitrary restriction on defendants right to testify on her own behalf, in absence of clear evidence by the state repudiating validity of all post hypnosis recollections. Let's go back to phrenology! |
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Term
| . Mobley v. State (GA 1995) |
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Definition
| Right to testify is a tactical choice of a defendant, however, defense counsel must advise defendant of the potential perils of testimony, after which, the defendant can competently choose to take the stand. |
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Term
| . GA Code 17-8-75: Where counsel in the hearing of jury makes statements of prejudicial matters not in evidence... |
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Definition
| [on objection made] the court shall rebuke the counsel and issue an instruction to the jury to remove the improper impression. The judge may also order a mistrial if the prosecutor is the offender. |
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Term
| . O'Neal v. State (GA 2010) |
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Definition
| "come back and see how many times we have this much evidence." Def. Counsel objected, trial court gave no curative instruction after request. Appeals court held that def. waived appellate review by not getting a final ruling on his request. Supreme held that waiver was invalid, and that merely asking for a curative instruction preserves your right to appeal. |
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Term
| . Pearson v. State, (2004) |
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Definition
Prosecutor may not comment on defendant's silence before arrest, or failure to come forward voluntarily, even when def. chooses to testify. You can be impeached with pre-arrest silence if no govt. action induced it
d. |
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Term
| United States v. Perez (1824) |
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Definition
| courts have authoirty, taking in all circumstances, to declare a mistrial if there is a "manifest necessity." No bar to future prosecution. |
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Term
| . Ferguson v. State (GA 1963) |
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Definition
The time for making a motion for mistrial is not ripe until the case has begun, and the trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled and sworn. A defendant is considered in Jeopardy when:
1. He's in a court of competent jurisdiction
2. Upon sufficient indictment
3. The def. has been arraigned
4. The def. has pleaded
5. The jury has been impaneled
6. The jury has been sworn.
*Manifestly Necessary - some misfortune that renders continuation of the trial impossible or unreasonably prejudicial. |
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Term
| Illinois v. Somerville (1973) |
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Definition
| The judge can declare a mistrial sua sponte, against the defendant's will and double jeopardy will not bar retrial. |
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Term
| Gori v. United States (1961) |
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Definition
A mistrial doesn't automatically result in a bar of future prosecution, left to discretion of judge(?)
Examples that bar future pros.:
1. Where the jury was discharged through the trial judge's construction of the law
2. Where the judge has made a mistake in concluding that the jury was illegally impanelled or biased
3. Where the defendant has been discharged when the trial judge erred in his estimate of the prejudicial quality of the remarks made by counsel for the accused
4. Where the jurors were found to be drinking beer which was brought in by the baliff |
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Term
| Laster v. State (GA 1997) |
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Definition
| Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting mistrial when defense counsel injected prejudicial issue of victim's violent acts into opening argument without having first made prima facie showing. Double jeopardy bar would not prevent state from retrying defendant for murder; public's interest outweighed def.'s right to particular jury. |
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Term
| . McGee v. State (GA 2007) |
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Definition
| Once a jury has been impaneled and sworn, a defendant has a constitutional right under Double Jeopardy clause to be tried by that jury, which right should not be abridged lightly. "It is therefore fundamentally unfair to penalize the defendant or defense for not immediately coming up with alternatives for mistrial" |
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Term
| Clemons v. State (GA 2002) |
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Definition
| A motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the moving party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion. The motion must be made at the time of the objectionable event; otherwise, the motion is not timely and will be considered waived because of delay. |
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Term
| United States v. Starling (1978) |
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Definition
| whether or not the record indicates that the trial judge has considered the alternatives to mistrial is significant. |
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Term
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Definition
| "It is well established that jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn." Once impaneled, court may not discharge the jury unless there is a manifest necessity, or the ends of public justice are otherwise defeated |
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Term
| . Benton v. Maryland (1969) |
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Definition
| Double Jeopardy prohibition in 5th applies to the states. |
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Term
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Definition
When trial is terminated over objection of def, the classic test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial is manifest necessity. Where a mistrial is requested by the def. there is no manifest necessity standard.
*Intent of the prosecutor is the standard for determining whether double jeopardy bars retrial when a defendant successfully moves for mistrial. "prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on def.'s motion, does not bar retrial absent intent on part of the prosecutor to subvert the protection afforded by double jeopardy"
*Basically, "only where the government conduct is intended to 'goad' defendant into moving for mistrial may defendant raise double jeopardy bar. |
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Term
| . State v. Thomas (GA 2002) |
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Definition
| Prosecutor can't goad the defendant into a mistrial and then retry him. Trier of fact determines if "goading" took place. |
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Term
| Lackes v. State (GA 2001) |
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Definition
Prosecutorial misconduct can bar retrial after a mistrial is declared on the basis of double jeopardy, but "it must be shown that the state intended to goad the defendant into moving for mistrial" so they could get a better result on retrial.
** Where a trial is found to be defective due to harmful evidentiary error, that error can be cured by holding a new trial in which no harmful errors occur. |
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Term
| Pearson v. State (GA 2004) |
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Definition
| Pros. can't comment on silence (above) |
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Term
| Laster v. State (GA 1997) |
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Definition
| Def injected victim violent acts (above) |
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Term
| United States v. Scott (1978) |
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Definition
Several propositions
1. An acquittal cannot be appealed and terminates prosecution.
2. When the defendant chooses to avoid conviction because of a legal claim that the govt's case must fail despite proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, double jeopardy doesn't apply. |
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Term
| Ball v. United States (1896) |
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Definition
| When an indictment is set aside, you can be tried under another indictment. |
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Term
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Definition
| Brown was not subject to a former “prosecution” by virtue of her paying the fine for a seat belt violation. Accordingly, the State's subsequent prosecution is not barred." |
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Term
| . Boutwell v. State (GA 2011) |
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Definition
| the term "same conduct" under the statute requiring the state to prosecute crimes arising from the same conduct does not mean merely the same type of conduct. For example, if you're charged with burglary at one kinkos and you secretly broke into all the kinkos in the southeast, double jeopardy doesn't attach to all the other kinkos despite them being literally "same conduct" I know it's 2012 and we still discuss this shit. |
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Term
| Spencer v. State (GA 2007) |
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Definition
| An unsworn jury that acquitted defendant of one of several counts, doesn't count becaue they are wholly without authority to be a jury. |
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Term
| Johnson v. State (GA 1996) |
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Definition
| Can't have a directed verdict of guilt. |
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Term
| . Ga Code 17-8-56 - Courts shall read |
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Definition
| Courts shall read the charge as is, it shall be rror to give any additional charge. If you object to a part of a charge, you must do it before the jury goes to deliberate and it shall be done outside the presence of the jury. |
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Term
| Baptiste v. State (GA 2011) - |
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Definition
| A criminal defendant must inform the court of the specific objection and grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate. Failure to object precludes appellate review unless such portion of the charge constitutes plain error. |
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Term
| Jones v. United States (1999) |
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Definition
| Jury instructions must be evaluated in the context of the entire charge. Ambiguous instructions may be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions. Jurors are presumed to have followed instructions. |
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Term
| . Jackson v. Virginia (US) |
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Definition
| The relevant question is that, viewing evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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Term
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Definition
| In a criminal prosecution, allowing written charges to go out to the jury room is proper because the presence of written instructions serves to enlighten, rather than confuse the jury. |
|
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Term
| . FRCP 26.3 - the court, before ordering a mistrial, must give |
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Definition
| must give each party an opportunity to comment on the propriety of the order, to state whether the party consents or objects, or suggest alternatives. |
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Term
| . McGee v. State (GA 2007) |
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Definition
once a jury is impaneled and sworn def. has the right to be tried by that jury under Double Jeopardy clause. Therefore, a trial is improperly terminated when there's no manifest necessity.
** OCGA 16-1-8(a)(a) - Non jury trial jeopardy attaches when first witness is sworn and gives testimony |
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Term
| State v. Aycock (GA 2007) |
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Definition
| A court may not enter a nolle pros. after case has been submitted to jury except by consent of defendant. If the entry of nolle pros. is entered, it is a bar to subsequent indictment if its submitted without consent. |
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Term
| Allen v. United States (1896) |
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Definition
| "Dynamite charge" case, judge can issue a strongly worded charge that implies the jury should return some kind of verdict. |
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Term
| . Burchette v. State,(GA 2004) |
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Definition
| excluded the "this case must be decided by some jury" portion of Allen Charge because it was inaccurate. |
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Term
| . Preston v. Blackledge (1971) |
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Definition
| Court held that where four previous trials resulting in mistrial by reason of jury disagreement, a fifth was violative of double jeopardy. |
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Term
| . Taylor v. State, (GA 2009) |
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Definition
| It's within the court's discretion to give an Allen Charge to a disagreeing jury. |
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Term
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Definition
| one of the jurors map quested something on his phone during trial. Jurors testified they didn't consider the info. There must be a reasonable probability the misconduct contributed to the conviction in order to upset a jury verdict. |
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Term
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Definition
| in determining cruel/unusual punishment, courts generally look at the method and amount. Cruel at adoption: crucifixion, burning at the stake, etc. |
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Term
| Gregg v. Georgia (1976 US) |
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Definition
| SCOTUS held the death penalty is not inherently cruel, but just an "extreme sanction suitable to the most extreme crimes" |
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Term
| Atkins v. Virginia (2004) |
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Definition
| Due to evolving standards of decency, the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the 8th amendment |
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Term
| Dawson v. State of Georgia (GA 2001) |
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Definition
| Outlawed electrocution because it's cruel and unusual under the state const. |
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Term
| In order for a def. to be eligible for the death penalty he or she must be found |
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Definition
| guilty of homicide, kidnapping w/ bodily injury, or aircraft hijacking |
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Term
| McKane v. Durston (1894) - |
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Definition
| An appeal is not absolute right. It is wholly within the discretion of the state to allow or not to allow such review. |
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Term
| Halbert v. Michigan (2005) |
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Definition
| No constitutional requirement for appeals. |
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Term
| Griffin v. Illinois (1956) |
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Definition
| There is no requirement for appellate review, but if you have it, you can't have a system that discriminates against poor people. |
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Term
|
Definition
| Historical limited right to appeal exists, based on common law embodied in the Fifth Amendment. |
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Term
| Brinkley v. State (GA 2012) |
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Definition
Brinkley filed directly to the GA supreme court saying he had a novel constitutional question. They disagreed, saying there was no timely objection preserving it for review. They subsequently transferred jurisdiction to the court of appeals.
**GA Supreme Ct. has exclusive jurisdiction of a number of cases |
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Term
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Definition
| Court of Appeals, rather than Supreme, has jurisdiction to review a conviction even though the defendant contended stat-rape was unconstitutional. The trial court never ruled on that contention, and thus, no question of constitutionality had be preserved for review. |
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Term
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Definition
| Court of Appeals has jurisdiction because the only constitutional contention was that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, (without determining that defendant had not been denied RTC in past) |
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Term
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Definition
| De novo - "anew" appellate courts heart it all from the beginning |
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Term
|
Definition
| trial courts findings on disputed facts will not be reversed unless the judge made a decision that has its basis on a plainly erroneous understanding of the facts. (Williams v. State GA 2011) |
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Term
|
Definition
Where the trial court exercised discretion, this is the standard. Sorry. Nobody ever gets reversed on AoD.
Reed v. State GA 2011 - |
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Term
| North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) |
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Definition
| The constitution does not impose a bar to more severe sentence upon reconviction after an appeal has reversed the original sentence. |
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Term
|
Definition
| def. has right to "guiding hand" of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. |
|
|
Term
| . Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) |
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Definition
| def. in all federal criminal trials has RTC |
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Term
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Definition
| - appointing counsel in a state prosecution under circumstances that preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep and trial of a capital case is denial of due process of law. In this case, counsel wasn't appointed until after indictment, but def. wanted to challenge grand jury composition. |
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Term
| Gideon v. Wainright (1963) |
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Definition
| assistance of counsel for all crim. trials. |
|
|
Term
| . McMann v. Richardson (1970) |
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Definition
| defendants facing felony charges are entitled to effective assistance of competent counsel. |
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Term
| Strickland v. Washington (1984) - |
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Definition
he 6th amendment rtc is the right to effective assistance of counsel. "Whether or not counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Two prong test
1. Def. must show that counsel's performance fell below that of professional standards.
2. Def. must show that the performance was so prejudicial as to create uncertainty about the reliability of the outcome of the case. |
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Term
|
Definition
| The right of effective ass. is the right of the accuse to require the prosecution's case to survive the adversarial process |
|
|
Term
| . Lafler v. Cooper (2012) |
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Definition
| - a favorable plea was reported to client, but on advice of counsel, it was refused. def. was found guilty at trial and received a harsher sentence. Trial counsel's advice with respect to the plea offer fell below the standard adequate assistance of counsel guaranteed by 6th + 14th |
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Term
|
Definition
| Mears showboating case. His guy went up for appeal saying ineffective. Mears got him acquitted of two charges, and life on his capital offense. No ineffective assistance. |
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Term
| Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) |
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Definition
| Having counsel represent multiple defendants where their defenses create a conflict, deprives them of the guarantee of assistance of counsel. In this case, a single public defender was appointed to represent 3 defendants all with contrary defenses. |
|
|
Term
| . Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466. U.S. 335 (1990) |
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Definition
This was the case of the two private attorneys representing 3 people charged with murder, they rested after the prosecutions first case as a strategic move, basically sacrificing the first defendant. There are a few rules.
- Unless the state trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court itself need not initiate an inquiry into the propriety of multiple representation.
- In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance
- The possibility that a conflict of interest arose from multiple representation is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction |
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Term
| . McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) |
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Definition
| - Inadequate assistance of counsel as the result of a conflict of interest violates 6th amend guarantee. |
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Term
| Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) |
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Definition
| - " but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different." standard on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. |
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Term
| Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246 (2004) |
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Definition
- Trial counsel's accepting a fee from def. family to represent him on murder charges in a different county at the same time that counsel was appointed to represent defendant on murder did not prejudice defendant. No evidence that counsels representation of defendant on murder charges in another country detracted from his representation of client.
- Counsels use of the same expert that evaluated the children victims in the case did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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