Term
|
Definition
- 2 steps of Chevron
- Express v. implicit delegation
- Brown v. Williamson (step 1)
- Young v. Community Nutrition (step 2)
- INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (step 1)
- Babbitt (step 2)
- Mead
- Skidmore
- Hearst
|
|
|
Term
FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco |
|
Definition
- Chevron Step 1
- FDA issued rule designed to prevent marketing of tobacco products to young people
- Congress foreclosed removal of tobacco from market --> Congress spoke to the issue
- FDA would contradict Congress if ordered ban
- not giving deference to substnace of agency's statements, but Congress used agency's statements in making law
- larger scheme: tobacco's role in economy
- Dissent: appropriate for FDA to consider new Evidence
|
|
|
Term
Young v. Community Nuturition Institute |
|
Definition
- ambiguity in FDCA dealing with power of FDA to set tolerance levels for poisonous substances in food
- FDA refused to set tolerance level
- SCOTUS agreed there was sufficient ambiguity to defer to FDA's interpretation
- "shall" is not a clear congressional mandate
|
|
|
Term
Massachusetts v. EPA (II)
|
|
Definition
- This is not like Willaimson because (1) EPA jurisdictoin would not lead to extreme measure as was hte case in Williamson; (2) court in Williamson pointed to unbroken series of Congressional enactments
|
|
|
Term
Chevron Facts and Holding |
|
Definition
- CAA required non attainment states to establish a permit program regulating new/modified major sationary sources of pollutin and EPA allows states to treat all pollution emitting devices within same industry grouping as single bubble
- stationary source: bubble idea
- court allowed stationary source idea- deference
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- (1) whether Congress has spoken to precise question at issue (INS v. Cardoza, Brown and Williamson)
- (2) if statute is silent/ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, question for the court is whether agency's answer is based on permissible construction fo the statute
- not clear what permissible means- range of deference
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- NLRB orders Hearst to bargin collectively wiht newsboys
- split between question of law and fact
- NLRA doesn't include common law understanding of independent contractor
- court not second guessing congress
- no definition of employee in NLRA
- majority thinks Congress intentionally left open what an employee is for NLRB to decide- deference
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Private firefighters sued defendant to recover overtime pay when they had to wait in hall overnight
- must give some deference to agency
- agency issued interpretive bulletin explaining opinion- unlike Hearst because responding generally
- interpretive bulletin not controlling, but court gives deference because of agency's expertise
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Congress explicitly left gap for agency to fill
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- court cannot substitute its own statutory construction for reasonable interpretation by agency
|
|
|
Term
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon |
|
Definition
- ESA makes it unlawful for anyone to take a species
- secretary of interior issues reg to define harm to mean habitat modification- broadens agency reach
- SCOTUS upheld definition because: (1) ordinary understanding of harm supports it; (2) broad prupsoe of ESA supports secretary's decision; (3) 10(a)(1)(B) of ESA strongly suggsts Congress understood 9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings
- Dissent: expansion of take- stretch beyond Congressional intent
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Court refused to find ambiguity in provision of refugee act authorizing INS to grant asylum to an alien becauase of well founded fear of prosecution in his homeland
- not agency's job to interpret statutory language- that is the court's job
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Courts defer to agency's interpretation of law and that deference is strong- allowing agencies leeway in interpretation
- Young v. Community Nutrition
- Babbitt
|
|
|
Term
Difference between Skidmore, Mead and Chevron |
|
Definition
- Skidmore and Mead are different from Chevron because of level of formality in agency used in coming to rule or reg
- Skidmore and mead- agency has judgment on particular set of facts; EPA reg in Chevron was broader and publicly presented; decisions in Skidmore and Mead are more narrow
|
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Day planners were originally categorized as other which meant duty free- now diary has 4% tariff
- ruling letter issued (different from reg) - not subject to notice and comment; issued 10,000 per year so subject to less Chevron deference- fi court gave Chevron deference to all of these almost total deference to agency and court does not think that is what Congress wanted
- Skidmore deference is halfway point
- rulign letters did not bind third parties
- court gives some consideration to agency's interpretation because of experience
|
|
|
Term
Wehn to apply Chevron deference |
|
Definition
- Congress delegated authority to agency generally to make rules carrying force of law and agency's interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority
|
|
|