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Definition
If something has rights, then doing something to violate those rights is morally impermissible.
Nonhuman animals have rights.
So, doing something to violate those rights is morally impermissible (1,2 modus ponens).
Experimenting on animals violates their rights.
Thus, animal experimentation is morally impermissible. |
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Term
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Definition
If there is a morally relevant distinction between two kinds, then it is not wrong (in the same way sexism and racism are wrong) to accord the two kinds different moral statuses.
There is a morally relevant distinction between humans and nonhuman animals, insofar as humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don’t.
Therefore it is not wrong to accord humans a different moral status to humans, and thus humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don’t (1,2 modus ponens). |
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Term
| Argument from Inconsistency |
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Definition
Factory farming leads to much more animal suffering than animal experimentation.
If animal experimentation is morally impermissible, then factory farming is morally impermissible (1 and the principle of utility).
But, factory farming is not morally impermissible – it is an accepted part of our culture.
Therefore, animal experimentation is not morally impermissible. |
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Term
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Definition
Animal experimentation causes suffering and is prima facie bad.
But, if an act causes some suffering but also results in great benefits for all sentient beings that outweighs the bad resulting from the suffering, then that act is not only permissible, but may be obligatory.
Animal experimentation has lead to great benefits that improve the lives of all sentient beings, which greatly outweighs the suffering caused.
Therefore, animal experimentation is permissible (and may be obligatory). |
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Term
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Definition
Assume that the experiment is important, but one which we never consider conducting on a human being.
Either the thing which we are considering using as a surrogate (model of human physiology) is not like us, or it is like us.
If the animal is not like us, then there is no benefit that we will get from the experiment, and we ought not perform the experiment (e.g., oysters and trees).
If the animal is like us, then due to the principle of equality, we ought not perform the experiment (e.g., squirrels and orphans).
Therefore, we ought not perform the experiment. |
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Term
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Definition
| trys to add to the utilitarian argument from benefit to advocate for differential treatment reasoning from great chain of being, human ancestory, and quality of life |
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