Term
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Definition
| the use of animals in biomedical research |
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Term
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Definition
If something has rights, then doing something to violate those rights is morally impermissible.
Nonhuman animals have rights.
So, doing something to violate those rights is morally impermissible (1,2 modus ponens).
Experimenting on animals violates their rights.
Thus, animal experimentation is morally impermissible. |
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Term
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Definition
| Rights entail obligations, but having an obligation does not entail that it is grounded by a right. (internal commitments, differences in status, special relationships) |
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Term
| since cohen is for animal experimentation what grounds our duties to puppy punting |
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Definition
nonmaleficence
beneficence |
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Term
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Definition
| Something is a member of the moral community iff it has the capacity for moral judgment. |
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Term
| Can Non-Moral Agents Have Rights? |
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Definition
Does the lion have to respect the baby zebra’s right? How about vice versa?
Does an infant have to respect its mother’s right to a good night sleep? If not, then what does that say about the infant’s rights? |
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Term
Capacity for Moral Judgment
The person is actually able to make moral judgments? |
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Definition
| Infants, the comatose, severely mentally disabled, etc. |
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Term
Capacity for Moral Judgment
The person can develop the ability to make moral judgments? |
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Definition
| Normal infants are fine, but not those who are severely intellectually disabled nor the permanently comatose. |
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Term
Capacity for Moral Judgment
The person belongs to a kind of which some number of its members can make moral judgments? |
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Definition
| All humans count, but what does some mean? |
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Term
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Definition
| “[Similarly to the racist and sexist], the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species.” |
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Term
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Definition
| The argument from speciesism “draws an offensive moral conclusion from a deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly specious.” |
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Term
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Definition
If there is a morally relevant distinction between two kinds, then it is not wrong (in the same way sexism and racism are wrong) to accord the two kinds different moral statuses.
There is a morally relevant distinction between humans and nonhuman animals, insofar as humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don’t.
Therefore it is not wrong to accord humans a different moral status to humans, and thus humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don’t (1,2 modus ponens). |
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Term
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Definition
| Begging the question is an informal fallacy whereby the argument includes the conclusion as one of the premises. |
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Term
| The defense of speciesism begs the question becuase |
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Definition
| premise 2 says humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don’t. Then, the conclusion says humans have moral status and nonhuman animals don't |
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Term
| Utilitarian Argument from Benefit |
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Definition
Animal experimentation causes suffering and is (at least) prima facie bad.
But, if an act causes some suffering but also results in great benefits for all sentient beings that outweigh the bad resulting from the suffering, then that act is morally justified.
Animal experimentation has lead to great benefits (at least in the long run) that improve the lives of all sentient beings, which greatly outweigh the suffering caused.
Therefore, animal experimentation is justified. |
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